civilian and military heads of chains of command, who pass orders and regulations to military doctors in the field, in charge of the health of enemy combatants, as well as U. S. soldiers. Because we recently marked the sixtieth anniversary of the judgment at Nuremberg, I want to awaken our collective memory to the ways in which doctors in war, even in a war very different from the one the Nazis fought, can insulate themselves from their moral and professional consciences.
Litton's research is, in part, a follow-up study. It is about the conflict and moral residue that linger, close to a half a century later. The follow-up story of the medical and mental health personnel who are part of the Guantanamo detention center has not yet been told. The detention center is still in operation; and five years after its erection, there have been no trials of doctors and no charges brought. Nor is it clear that there should be charges and trials. But the absence of the spotlight makes it all the more imperative to sketch the current involvement of doctors and health workers in the operation of the Guantanamo center and to shed some light on their professional roles and on the psychological distancing mechanisms at work.
In October 2005 I visited the center with a small group of civilian psychiatrists, psychologists, top military doctors, and Department of Defense civilian health affairs officials to observe detainee medical and mental health care. Among the unspoken reasons for the invitation was a steep rise in hunger strikes in mid-June 2005, as well as the bruising criticism the administration had received, over that summer and fall, for its use of psychiatrists and psychologists in interrogation procedures. More specifically, there were well-publicized allegations that "resilience training" for our own soldiers at Fort Bragg was "reverse engineered" at Guantanamo for the infliction of torture. There were reports of the breach of confidential psychiatric records used in tailoring interrogation tactics. And there was concern about largescale force-feeding of hunger strikers through stomach tubes.
Though we were invited as observers, we saw none of the 505 inmates during the whole day, save for one stolen glimpse of two bearded prisoners in white tunics and loose pants behind screens and barbed wire. Still, two scenes involving inmates made my moral worries concrete.
Seven detainees were on hunger strike, a steep drop from the escalated numbers over the summer. We were assured that the hunger strikers were being treated humanely. The commanding doctor at the time, Captain John Edmonson, showed our group (which included U.S. Surgeon General Richard Carmona, Army Surgeon General Kevin Kiley, Joint Staff Surgeon Joseph Kelly, as well as top civilian physicians who work for Undersecretary of Defense for Health Affairs William Winkenwerder) a tube used for feeding-a thin nasogastric tube, a 10-French Dobhoff-and explained that lubrication and anesthesia were routinely used before insertion. The senior military and civilian doctors listened attentively as they were told that there was overall "complicity," in that most strikers did not forcibly resist insertion of the tubes or remove them once they were in place. Not one doctor asked about the consequences of not acquiescing to the tube; none openly worried that acquiescence might not be the same thing as consent; none voiced the concern that pulling out a nose tube funneled down the back of one's throat to the top of one's stomach might, in some circumstances, be painful, and that failure to do that might at best be a weak form of consent.
The scene is disturbing in light of confirmed reports, just four months after my visit, that striking detainees had been strapped into restraint chairs during and immediately after force-feeding in order to prevent, according to officials, purging and asphyxiation that might result from being fed in a prostrate position. Some detainees alleged that while in the chair they were force-fed not only nutrients but also diuretics and laxatives. The result was that they A SECOND SCENE has returned to me often. We were taken to the psychiatric wing of the hospital and introduced to two young female army psychiatrists. The presiding commander of Guantanamo at the time, General Jay W. Hood, praised them highly for their dedication in the face of resistance from detainees.
Five months later, I replayed that scene as I listened to the account of a detainee lawyer, Joshua Colangelo-Bryan. Colangelo-Bryan is a young lawyer who, in his own words, is "cynical by nature" and takes all his clients' reports with "a grain of salt." When he took on the representation of several Bahrainee detainees at Guantanamo in 2004, he took their concerns with an even "bigger grain of salt" than he would in a typical case of commercial litigation. One of those detainees, Jumah al-Dossari, had been in Camp 5, the maximum-security facility, for extended periods. The blocks in Camp 5 have solid walls, with the only access to the outside world being a food-tray slot on a door that opens to a hall where large industrial fans drown out any attempt at conversation. Not surprisingly, al-Dossari suffered from the psychological stress of isolation. During their consultations, al-Dossari said that in interrogation sessions he was wrapped in an Israeli flag, chained to a floor while a female interrogator put on his face what he believed to be menstrual blood, and beaten unconscious by guards. The attorney was initially skeptical of some of the statements until he later read FBI memos and a book by a military officer that detailed exactly the same interrogation techniques his client had described, including the menstrual blood tactic.
In the spring of 2005, while al-Dossari was still in Camp 5, he asked his attorney in a quiet voice, "What can I do from going crazy?" On October 15, 2005, Colangelo-Bryan went down to Guantanamo to consult with him. During the interview, al-Dossari said he needed to go to the bathroom. Colangelo-Bryan called in the military police so that they could remove the shackles holding al-Dossari to the floor in the meeting area. The attorney then walked out of the room and the MPs took al-Dossari to a small cell with a toilet, located on the other side of the meeting area and separated from it by a steel mesh wall. A couple of minutes went by, and then a few more. The attorney had a sense that something might be wrong and peeked into the door to the meeting area. There he saw a pool of blood. He looked up to find a gaunt figure hanging from the mesh wall on the cell side, face covered in blood, body limp, eyes rolled back in his head, his lips and mouth swollen and protruded. He called in the MPs who cut down al-Dossari from the mesh wall and, at the attorney's request, began CPR. Colangelo-Bryan was ordered to leave, but as he left he heard al-Dossari gasp for air.
Al-Dossari survived this suicide attempt, but during his time at Guantanamo he has tried to commit suicide eleven other times. (There were three successful suicides at Guantanamo by other detainees in June of 2006.) After alDossari's October 15 attempt, his attorney asked for transfer to a less isolating camp, some meaningful social interaction, a few books, and one telephone call with his family. All four requests were denied. Al-Dossari then filed a motion with the court that was also denied. The Court argued that he was not isolated because he had been interrogated twenty-nine times over the past two years-"a novel legal position," his attorney commented (though perhaps in line with the notion that rapport building is, as I was told by Hood, the preferred method of interrogation at Guantanamo). Because of the Graham-Levin Amendment stripping detainee cases of habeas corpus (upheld recently in the Military Commissions Act), al-Dossari's team has not been able to obtain legal relief.
Legal issues aside, the case raises concerns about the role of psychiatrists and behavioral therapists at Guantanamo: in particular, were mental health workers involved in decisions about al-Dossari's isolation and restrictions? Are they typically involved in such decisions?
I present these vignettes in order to pinpoint morally troubling medical issues that remain part of our detention policy at Guantanamo. In what follows I want to isolate several psychological mechanisms that enable doctors and health care workers, both sixty years ago and now, to insulate their moral consciences. W E HEAR MUCH about Guantanamo as a legal black hole-one that falls between the cracks of the laws of armed conflict and the federal criminal law system. But Guantanamo is also a moral black hole. It is a place where, by design, morality is made to recede. Unfortunately, the methods by which morality disappears at Guantanamo are not novel.
In the Nazi period, euphemistic and scientific language played a critical role in the medicalization of killing. Thus, killing "life unworthy of life" (whether the term came to denote Jews, homosexuals, Roma, Catholic critics, the mentally ill, the physically feeble, or other "impure" strains) was a matter of "euthanasia." The Greek word, to the ears of some Nazi doctors, retained the positive overtones of its etymological root, as Adolf Wahlmann, medical director at the killing institution Hadamar, was eager to insist in legal testimony. Lifton reports his defense of lethal injection as "a completely painless method," and his noting that "the term euthanasia comes from the Greek eu, which means beautiful." Imageries of "therapeutic killing," "killing as healing and cure," "killing for the sake of the strong and the healthy," helped to further promote the myth of "special treatment" as therapeutic. Medical questionnaires, evaluations, and statistical analysis under professorial leadership and management-in short, the stuff of institutionalized science and academe, all added to the legitimization of the process.
Institutions such as Guantanamo are not killing centers like Hadamar was-that's not the comparison I want to make. But they have been torture centers, and euphemisms and medicalized terms have helped insulate practitioners from moral conflict. As one enters the Guantanamo center, one passes under a gateway that reads "Honor Bound." The sign is still in place, despite the growing desperation of the inmates about their treatment. Behavioral Science Consultation Teams, BSCTs (pronounced "biscuits," and their members, "BSCs," behavioral science consultants) are typically military psychologists who help tailor individual interrogation plans. The acronyms insert psychological distance between mental health and interrogation, as does the fact that a "biscuit" is never physically present in an interrogation room with a detainee, but on the other side of a two-way mirror.
Coerced consent of victims is an explicit feature of the Nazi period. In the T4 prototype for the final solution, the policy was to gain "consent" from the parents of mentally ill children for the transfer of their children to the "Children's Specialty Departments," also euphemistically known as "Therapeutic Convalescent Institutions." Those who showed reluctance were threatened with removal of guardianship.
The coercion implicit in force-feeding at Guantanamo is very different, more nuanced in its attitude toward the moral subject, and aimed at keeping people alive. Still, it ought to worry us. A hunger striker, according to officials with whom I spoke at Guantanamo, is a detainee who misses nine meals. Consent to being force-fed is expressed, according to the base doctors, by the absence of active resistance. Arguably, force-feeding is, in certain circumstances, the humane response of a doctor to a hunger striker. These may be circumstances where a patient lacks adequate autonomy to make an informed choice. But this would suggest that a doctor or staff member's prior obligation ought to be to promote, to the degree possible, circumstances that enable autonomous choice, such as consultation with trusted persons, whether family members or clergy. It is not clear if these steps have been taken at Guantanamo.
In Tim Golden's New York Times Magazine article on Guantanamo, of September 17, 2006, Edmonson, the senior medical doctor at the base when I was there, reflected candidly, "Anytime you're doing a procedure that the patient doesn't want, it's not a place you want to be . . . .What takes precedence? The patient's rights or their life? It's not an easy question." Yet saving life at Guantanamo has often seemed more a politically motivated concern than a humanitarian one.
Lifton's study makes clear how a highly bureaucratic division of labor and roles diffuses a sense of individual responsibility for one's actions. This point is by now a well-documented part of the working of Nazi machinery. Psychological and moral numbing is, in part, a result of seeing oneself as not really "in charge" of decisions. Actions are perceived as beyond one's own doing, making, or stopping.
Guantanamo, too, divides labor in a way that aims at professional insulation. During my visit, one of the pressing questions posed to the visiting team was not if psychologists or psychiatrists should consult on interrogation plans, but which professional should. The preference among some Pentagon advisers was to use psychologists rather than psychiatrists for intelligence gathering. One reason seemed to be that psychologists, as non-physicians, are not perceived as strictly bound by the Hippocratic maxim, do no harm, as are physicians. Also, psychologists have a strong tradition of working in forensics, where the client is not the patient. Not irrelevant, perhaps, is that the American Psychological Association has been less explicit in its condemnations of participation at Guantanamo than the American Psychiatric Association.
T
HE VERY DISCUSSION about which kind of health care provider ought to support interrogation should raise red flags. If the "ought" is a moral one, then no health professional of any stripe ought to be involved in interrogation where there is strong institutional pressure to use coercive techniques and torture. Moreover, the institutional separation of psychiatrists from interrogation does not itself excuse them from complicity while serving in non-interrogational roles, because it is unlikely that clinicians at Guantanamo remain ignorant of the actual conditions of interrogation and confinement. Indeed, in al-Dossari's case, as his psychological conditions worsened, he requested help from mental health clinicians with both his release from the extreme isolation of Camp 5 and with access to more meaningful social contact. According to his attorney, their reply was that they could do nothing and that he had to speak to his interrogator. So, in this case, at least, clinicians seemed aware of a detainee's reports of suicidal depression, yet subordinated treatment to security. Thus, even if the institutional role of treatment is on paper separate from the interrogation role, those who treat can still cede their professional responsibility to those who interrogate.
I have drawn on lessons from the past not in order to shock or hyperbolize but to alert us to an aspect of our current detention largely occluded by focus on legal issues. It remains unclear how, if at all, the recently passed Military Commissions Act will affect medical and interrogation practices at Guantánamo. Also unclear is the toll our policies will take on the interrogators and health care providers themselves. But what remains clear is that more than four hundred individuals are still serving indefinite sentences at Guantánamo. The majority of those who have already been released have been returned to their home countries. The voices of the detainees need to be heard.
I conclude with the voice of Jumah alDossari from a note passed to his attorney in a sealed envelope, as they began their meeting on October 15, 2005. At the time of their meeting, al-Dossari told Colangelo-Bryan not to bother with the note; they would talk about it later. About four months later, the government declassified the suicide note: I know it is an awful and horrible scene, but there is no other alternative to make our voice heard by the world from the depths of the detention centers except this way in order for the world to reexamine its standing and for the fair people of America to look again at the situation and try to have a moment of truth with themselves . . . .When you remember me .. . remember that the world let us down and let our case down. Remember that our governments let us down. Remember the unreasonable delay of the courts in looking to our case and deciding the victims of justice . . . . I thank you for everything you have done for me. But I have one last request. Show the world my letters. Let the world read them. Let the world know of the agony of the detainees in Cuba.
Al-Dossari's voice is eloquent. And some, including one medical official to whom I spoke, may be eager to discount it for just that reason, as a clever appeal for sympathy by a welleducated terrorist. But in remembrance of Nuremberg and the international moral law it set in place, this is no time to let cynicism of fear best our humanity.
